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Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) Rule
[Federal Register: February 2, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 21)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 5095-5148]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02fe99-13]

[[Page 5095]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part II

Department of Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

Office of the Secretary
_______________________________________________________________________

49 CFR Parts 23 and 26

Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department of 
Transportation Programs; Final Rule

[[Page 5096]]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

49 CFR Parts 23 and 26

[Docket OST-97-2550; Notice 97-5]
RIN 2105-AB92

 
Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Department 
of Transportation Programs

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This final rule revises the Department of Transportation's 
regulations for its disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) program. 
The DBE program is intended to remedy past and current discrimination 
against disadvantaged business enterprises, ensure a ``level playing 
field'' and foster equal opportunity in DOT-assisted contracts, improve 
the flexibility and efficiency of the DBE program, and reduce burdens 
on small businesses. This final rule replaces the former DBE 
regulation, which now contains only the rules for the separate DBE 
program for airport concessions, with a new regulation. The new 
regulation reflects President Clinton's policy to mend, not end, 
affirmative action programs. It modifies the Department's DBE program 
in light of developments in case law requiring ``narrow tailoring'' of 
such programs and last year's Congressional debate concerning the 
continuation of the DBE program. It responds to comments on the 
Department's December 1992 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) and its 
May 1997 supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).

DATES: This rule is effective March 4, 1999. Comments on Paperwork 
Reduction Act matters should be received by April 5, 1999; however, 
late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

ADDRESSES: Persons wishing to comment on Paperwork Reduction Act 
matters (see discussion at end of preamble) should send comments to 
Docket Clerk, Docket No. OST-97-2550, Department of Transportation, 400 
7th Street, SW., Room 4107, Washington, DC 20590. We emphasize that the 
docket is open only with respect to Paperwork Reduction Act matters, 
and the Department is not accepting comments on other aspects of the 
regulation. We request that, in order to minimize burdens on the docket 
clerk's staff, commenters send three copies of their comments to the 
docket. Commenters wishing to have their submissions acknowledged 
should include a stamped, self-addressed postcard with their comments. 
The docket clerk will date stamp the postcard and return it to the 
commenter. Comments will be available for inspection at the above 
address from 10 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert C. Ashby, Deputy Assistant 
General Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement, Department of 
Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Room 10424, Washington, DC 20590, 
phone numbers (202) 366-9306 (voice), (202) 366-9313 (fax), (202) 755-
7687 (TDD), bob.ashby@ost.dot.gov (email); or David J. Goldberg, Office 
of Environmental, Civil Rights and General Law, Department of 
Transportation, 400 7th Street, SW., Room 5432, Washington, DC 20590, 
phone number (202) 366-8023 (voice), (202) 366-8536 (fax).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    The Department has the important responsibility of ensuring that 
firms competing for DOT-assisted contracts are not disadvantaged by 
unlawful discrimination. For eighteen years, the Department's most 
important tool for meeting this responsibility has been its 
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program. This program began in 
1980. Originally, the program was a minority/women's business 
enterprise program established by regulation under the authority of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other nondiscrimination 
statutes that apply to DOT financial assistance programs. See 49 CFR 
part 23.
    In 1983, Congress enacted, and President Reagan signed, the first 
statutory DBE provision. This statute applied primarily to small firms 
owned and controlled by minorities in the Department's highway and 
transit programs. Firms owned and controlled by women, and the 
Department's airport program, remained under the original 1980 
regulatory provisions. In 1987, Congress enacted, and President Reagan 
signed, statutes expanding the program to airports and to women-owned 
firms. In 1991 (for highway and transit programs) and 1992 (for airport 
programs), Congress enacted, and President Bush signed, statutes 
reauthorizing the expanded DBE program.
    After each statutory amendment, and at other times to resolve 
program issues, the Department amended part 23. The result has been 
that part 23 has become a patchwork quilt of a regulation. In addition, 
years of interpretation by various grantees and different DOT offices 
has created confusion and inconsistency in program administration. 
These problems, particularly in the area of certification, were 
criticized in General Accounting Office reports. The Department's 
desire to improve program administration and make the rule a more 
unified whole led to our publication of a December 1992 notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
    The Department received about 600 comments on this NPRM. The 
Department carefully reviewed these comments and, by early 1995, had 
prepared a draft final rule responding to them. However, in light of 
the Supreme Court's June 1995 decision in Adarand v. Pena and the 
Administration's review of affirmative action programs, the Department 
conducted further review of the DBE program. As a result, rather than 
issuing a final rule, we issued a supplemental notice of proposed 
rulemaking (SNPRM) in May 1997. This SNPRM incorporated responses to 
the comments on the 1992 NPRM and proposed further changes in the 
program, primarily in response to the ``narrow tailoring'' requirements 
of Adarand. We received about 300 comments on the SNPRM. The Department 
has carefully considered these comments, and the final rule responds to 
them. The final rule also specifically complies with the requirements 
that the courts have established for a narrowly tailored affirmative 
action program.
    At the same time that the Department was working on this final 
rule, Congress once again considered reauthorization of the DBE 
program. In both the House and the Senate, opponents of affirmative 
action sponsored amendments that would have effectively ended the 
program. In both cases, bipartisan majorities defeated the amendments. 
The final highway/transit authorization legislation, known as the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), retains the 
DBE program. In shaping this final rule, the Department has listened 
carefully to what both supporters and opponents of the program have 
said in Congressional debates.

Key Points of the Final Rule

    This discussion reviews and responds to the SNPRM comments and the 
Congressional debates on certain key issues. Congressional debate 
references are to the Congressional Record for March 5 and 6, 1998, for 
the Senate debate and April 1, 1998, for the House debate, unless 
otherwise noted.

[[Page 5097]]

1. Quotas and Set-Asides

    SNPRM Comments: Most comments on this issue came from non-DBE 
contractors, who argued that the program was a de facto quota program. 
Many of these contractors said that recipients insisted that they meet 
numerical goals regardless of other considerations, and that the 
recipients did not take showings of good faith efforts seriously. Some 
non-DBE contractor organizations argued, in addition, that the program 
was a quota program because it was based on a statute that had a 10 
percent target for the use of businesses defined by a racial 
classification.
    Congressional Debate: Opponents of the DBE program generally 
asserted that it created quotas or set-asides. Senator McConnell 
described the entire program, particularly the provision that ``not 
less than 10 percent'' of authorized funds go to DBEs, as

    * * * a $17.3 billion quota. In other words, if the government 
decides that you are the preferred race and gender, then you are 
able to compete for $17.3 billion of taxpayer-funded highway 
contracts. But, if you are the wrong race and gender, then--too 
bad--you can't compete for that $17 billion pot. (S1936).

The ``not less than 10 percent'' language also led opponents, such as 
Senator Ashcroft, to label the program a ``set-aside,'' (S1405), a term 
also employed in testimony provided by a law professor from California 
who said that the statute ``imposes a set-aside that's required 
regardless of the availability of race-neutral solutions.'' (S1407). 
Senator Gorton said that the DBE statute provides that ``those not 
defined as disadvantaged in our society are absolutely barred and 
prohibited from getting certain governmental contracts.'' (S1415).
    On the other hand, supporters of the program were adamant that it 
was not a quota program. Senator Baucus argued that the program, as 
implemented by DOT, allows substantial flexibility to recipients and 
contractors. Recipients could have an overall goal other than 10 
percent under current rules, he pointed out. Senator Kerry of 
Massachusetts added that what the statute does is to ``set a national 
goal. And it is appropriate in this country to set national goals for 
what we will do to try to break down the walls of discrimination. * * 
*'' (S1408). He also alluded to the flexibility of the Secretary to 
permit overall goals of less than 10 percent. Senator Robb stated:

    I want to stress at the outset that this program is not a 
``quota program,'' as some have suggested. There is a great 
difference [between] an aspirational goal and a rigid numerical 
requirement. Quotas utilize rigid numerical requirements as a means 
of implementing a program. The DBE program uses aspirational goals. 
(S1425).

    With respect to individual contract goals, Senator Baucus said, 
``once a goal is established for a contract, each contractor must make 
a good-faith effort to meet the goal--not mathematically required, not 
quota required, but a good faith effort to meet it.'' (S1402). Senator 
Baucus pointed to provisions of the SNPRM concerning overall goals, 
means of meeting them, and good-faith efforts as further narrowly 
tailoring the program. The SNPRM confirms, he said, that ``contract 
goals are not binding. If a contractor makes good faith efforts to find 
qualified women or minority-owned subcontractors, but fails to meet the 
goal, there is no penalty.'' (S1403). Senator Robb added that 
``Contract goals are not operated as quotas because they require that 
the prime contractor make `good faith efforts' to find DBEs. If a prime 
contractor cannot find qualified and competitive DBEs, the goal can be 
waived.'' (S1425).
    One of the Senators who addressed the quota/set-side issue in the 
most detail was Senator Domenici. He concluded that ``I do not agree 
that this minority business program we have in this ISTEA bill before 
us is a program that mandates quotas and mandates set-asides.'' 
(S1426). He made this statement, in part, on the basis of March 5, 
1998, letter to him signed by Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater 
and Attorney General Janet Reno. In relevant part, this letter (which 
Senator Domenici inserted into the record) read as follows:

    The 10 percent figure contained in the statute is not a 
mandatory set aside or rigid quota. First, the statute explicitly 
provides that the Secretary of Transportation may waive the goal for 
any reason * * * Second, in no way is the 10 percent figure imposed 
on any state or locality * * * Moreover, state agencies are 
permitted to waive goals when achievement on a particular contract 
or even for a specific year is not possible. The DBE program does 
not set aside a certain percentage of contracts or dollars for a 
specific set of contractors. Nor does the DBE program require 
recipients to use set-asides. The DBE program is a goals program 
which encourages participation without imposing rigid requirements 
of any type. Neither the Department's current nor proposed 
regulations permit the use of quotas. The DBE program does not use 
any rigid numerical requirements that would mandate a fixed number 
of dollars or contracts for DBEs. (S1427).

    The debate in the House proceeded in similar terms. Opponents of 
the DBE program, such as Representative Roukema (H2000), Representative 
Cox (H2004) and Speaker Gingrich (H2009) said the legislation 
constituted a quota, while proponents, such as Representatives Tauscher 
(H2001), Poshard (H2003), Bonior (H2004) and Menendez (H2004) said the 
program did not involve quotas or set-asides.
    DOT Response: The DOT DBE program is not a quota or set-aside 
program, and it is not intended to operate as one. To make this point 
unmistakably clear, the Department has added explicitly worded new or 
amended provisions to the rule.
    Section 26.41 makes clear that the 10 percent statutory goal 
contained in ISTEA and TEA-21 is an aspirational goal at the national 
level. It does not set any funds aside for any person or group. It does 
not require any recipient or contractor to have 10 percent (or any 
other percentage) DBE goals or participation. Unlike former part 23, it 
does not require recipients to take any special administrative steps 
(e.g., providing a special justification to DOT) if their annual 
overall goal is less than 10 percent. Recipients must set goals 
consistent with their own circumstances (see Sec. 26.45). There is no 
direct link between the national 10 percent aspirational goal and the 
way a recipient operates its program. The Department will use the 10 
percent goal as a means of evaluating the overall performance of the 
DBE program nationwide. For example, if nationwide DBE participation 
were to drop precipitously, the Department would reevaluate its efforts 
to ensure nondiscriminatory access to DOT-assisted contracting 
opportunities.
    Section 26.43 states flatly that recipients are prohibited from 
using quotas under any circumstances. The section also prohibits set-
asides except in the most extreme circumstances where no other approach 
could be expected to redress egregious discrimination. Section 26.45 
makes clear that in setting overall goals, recipients aspire to 
achieving only the amount of DBE participation that would be obtained 
in a nondiscriminatory market. Recipients are not to simply pick a 
number representing a policy objective or responding to any particular 
constituency.
    Section 26.53 also outlines what bidders must do to be responsive 
and responsible on DOT-assisted contracts having contract goals. They 
must make good faith efforts to meet these goals. Bidders can meet this 
requirement either by having enough DBE participation to meet the goal 
or by documenting good faith efforts, even if those efforts did not 
actually achieve the

[[Page 5098]]

goal. These means of meeting contract goal requirements are fully 
equivalent. Recipients are prohibited from denying a contract to a 
bidder simply because it did not obtain enough DBE participation to 
meet the goal. Recipients must seriously consider bidders' 
documentation of good faith efforts. To make certain that bidders' 
showings are taken seriously, the rule requires recipients to offer 
administrative reconsideration to bidders whose good faith efforts 
showings are initially rejected.
    These provisions leave no room for doubt: there is no place for 
quotas in the DOT DBE program. In the Department's oversight, we will 
take care to ensure that recipients implement the program consistent 
with the intent of Congress and these regulatory prohibitions.

2. Sanctions for Recipients Who Fail To Meet Overall Goals

    SNPRM Comments: The issue of sanctions for recipients who fail to 
meet overall goals was not a subject of comments on the SNPRM. Since 
the Department has never imposed such sanctions, this absence of 
comment is not surprising.
    Congressional Debate: DBE program opponents asserted, in connection 
with their argument that the DBE program is a quota program, that the 
Department could impose sanctions for failure to meet goals. ``The 
goals have requirements and the real threat of sanctions,'' Senator 
McConnell said. (S1488). Citing a provision of a Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) manual saying that if ``a state has violated or 
failed to comply with Federal laws or * * * regulations,'' FHWA could 
withhold Federal funding, Senator McConnell said,

    In other words, there are sanctions. The same threats appear in 
* * * the Federal transportation regulations * * * When the Federal 
government is wielding that kind of weapon from on high, it does not 
have to punish them. A 10 percent quota is still a quota, even if 
the States always comply and no one is formally punished. (Id.)

    Defenders of the DBE program pointed out that the Department had 
never punished a recipient for failing to meet an overall goal (e.g., 
Rep. Tauscher, H2001; Senator Boxer, S1433). Senator Domenici asked 
Secretary Slater and Attorney General Reno whether there are sanctions, 
penalties, or fines that may be (or ever have been) imposed on a 
recipient who does not meet DBE program goals. He entered the following 
reply in the record:

    No state has ever been sanctioned by DOT for not meeting its 
goals. Nothing in the statute or regulations imposes sanctions on 
any state recipient that has attempted in good faith, but failed, to 
meet its self-imposed goals. (S1427).

Senator Lieberman added that if states fail to meet their own goals, 
``there is no Federal sanction or enforcement mechanism.'' (S1493).
    DOT Response: The Department has never sanctioned a recipient for 
failing to meet an overall goal. We do not intend to do so. To 
eliminate any confusion, we have added a new provision (Sec. 26.47) 
that explicitly states that a recipient cannot be penalized, or treated 
by the Department as being in noncompliance with the rule, simply 
because its DBE participation falls short of its overall goal. For 
example, if a recipient's overall goal is 12 percent, and its 
participation is 8 percent, the Department cannot and will not penalize 
the recipient simply because its actual DBE participation rate was less 
than its goal.
    Overall goals are not quotas, and the Department does not sanction 
recipients because their participation levels fall short of their 
overall goals. Of course, if a recipient does not have a DBE program, 
does not set a DBE goal, does not implement its DBE program in good 
faith, or discriminates in the way it operates its program, it can be 
found in noncompliance. But its noncompliance would never be having 
failed to ``make a number.''

3. Economic Disadvantage

    SNPRM Comments: Some commenters favored eliminating the presumption 
of economic disadvantage, saying that applicants should have to prove 
their economic disadvantage. Other commenters favored obtaining 
additional financial information from applicants so that, even if the 
presumption remained in force, recipients would have a better idea of 
whether applicants really were disadvantaged. The question of the 
standard for determining disadvantage generated substantial comment, 
with some commenters favoring, and others objecting to, the proposed 
use of a personal net worth standard to assist recipients in 
determining whether an applicant was economically disadvantaged. There 
was also disagreement among commenters concerning the level at which 
such a standard should be set (e.g., $750,000, or something higher or 
lower). These comments, and the Department's response to them, are 
further discussed in the section-by-section analysis for Sec. 26.67.
    Congressional Debate: The Congress debated the topic of who is 
regarded as economically disadvantaged under the statute. DBE 
opponents, including Senators Ashcroft (S1405) and McConnell (S1418) 
and Representative Cox (H2004), asserted that outrageously rich people 
could be eligible to participate as DBEs, frequently using the Sultan 
of Brunei as an example. The basic thrust of their argument was that if 
the program does not exclude wealthy members of the designated groups--
meaning those who are not, in fact, disadvantaged--then it is 
``overinclusive'' and therefore not narrowly tailored. Senator 
McConnell added that, because the Department's SNPRM did not include a 
specific dollar amount for a cap on personal net worth, it would not be 
effective. (S1486). On the other hand, DBE program supporters cited the 
SNPRM's proposed net worth cap as an effective device to stop wealthy 
people from participating in the program. These included Minority 
Leader Daschle (with a reference to a letter from the Associate 
Attorney General, S1413), Senator Baucus (S1414, S1423), Senator 
Lieberman (S1493), Senator Boxer (S1433), and Senator Moseley-Braun, 
who responded to the Sultan of Brunei example by noting that the 
program was directed primarily at U.S. citizens (S1420).
    DOT Response: The final rule (Sec. 26.67) specifically imposes a 
personal net worth cap of $750,000. This means that, regardless of 
race, gender or the size of their business, any individual whose 
personal net worth exceeds $750,000 is not considered economically 
disadvantaged and is not eligible for the DBE program. The provision 
also makes it much easier for recipients to determine whether an 
individual's net worth exceeds the cap. Applicants will have to submit 
a statement of personal net worth and supporting documentation to the 
recipient with their applications. If the information shows net worth 
above the cap, the recipient would rebut the presumption based on the 
information in the application itself and the individual would not be 
eligible for the program. In such a case, it would not be necessary for 
a third party to challenge the economic disadvantage of an applicant in 
order to rebut the presumption. While there have been very few 
documented cases of wealthy individuals seeking to take advantage of 
the Department's program, the revised provisions of part 26 virtually 
eliminate even the possibility of this type of abuse.

4. Social Disadvantage

    SNPRM Comments: A few commenters suggested that the

[[Page 5099]]

presumption of social disadvantage, as well as that of economic 
disadvantage, be eliminated, so that applicants would have to 
demonstrate both elements of disadvantage. Any presumption of 
disadvantage tied to a racial classification, in the view of some of 
these commenters, undermined the constitutionality of the program. 
Other commenters noted that persons who are not members of the 
presumptively disadvantaged groups can be eligible and, in some cases, 
suggested that the criteria for evaluating such applications be 
clarified.
    Congressional Debate: The presumption of social disadvantage drew 
fire from DBE program opponents because it was allegedly overinclusive. 
For example, Senator McConnell produced a map illustrating the over 100 
countries of origin leading to inclusion in one of the presumed 
socially disadvantaged groups, pointing out that people from some 
countries (e.g., Pakistan) are presumed to be socially disadvantaged 
while those from other countries (e.g., Poland) are not. (S1418). 
Senator McConnell said that there was no basis for selecting this 
definition over any other. (Id.) Senator Hatch also listed the 
countries from which Asian-Pacific Americans and Subcontinent Asian-
Americans can originate, suggesting that it was inappropriate to create 
``all kinds of special interest groups who are vying for these 
programs.'' (S1411).
    DBE proponents responded that discrimination against minorities and 
women in general, and against specific minorities in particular (e.g., 
African Americans) was very real and formed a basis for the presumption 
of social disadvantage (see discussion below concerning the existence 
of discrimination). Senator Baucus also noted that this presumption 
could be overcome. (S1402).
    Opponents also charged that the presumption of social disadvantage 
was underinclusive; that is, ``you underinclude people who have a right 
to be included in the bid process.'' (Senator McConnell, S1399). The 
people who are not included who have a right to be, in the view of 
opponents, are white males (e.g., Senator Sessions' reference to 
testimony from Adarand Constructors' owner, S1400). Senator Kennedy 
disagreed with this assertion, saying

    Of course, this program doesn't just help women and minorities. 
It extends a helping hand to firms owned by white males, as well. 
They can be certified to [participate] if they prove that they have 
been disadvantaged. Just ask Randy Pech--owner of the Adarand 
Construction Firm--because he is currently seeking certification. 
(S1482).

Senator Domenici was interested in the same question, and entered into 
the record the following response from Secretary Slater and Attorney 
General Reno:

    Any individual owning a business may demonstrate that he is 
socially and economically disadvantaged, even if that individual is 
not a woman or a minority. Both the current and proposed regulations 
provide detailed guidance to recipients to assist them in making 
individual determinations of disadvantaged status. And, in fact, 
businesses owned by white males have qualified for DBE status. 
(S1427).

    DOT Response: By having passed the DBE statutory provision, after 
lengthy and specific debate, Congress has once again determined that 
members of the designated groups should be presumed socially 
disadvantaged. All of these groups are specifically incorporated by 
reference in the legislation that Congress debated and approved. This 
presumption (i.e., a determination that it is not necessary for group 
members to prove individually that they have been the subject of 
discrimination or disadvantage) is based on the understanding of 
Members of Congress about the discrimination that members of these 
groups have faced. The presumption is rebuttable in the DOT program. If 
a recipient or third party determines that there is a reasonable basis 
for concluding that an individual from one of the designated groups is 
not socially disadvantaged, it can pursue a proceeding under Sec. 26.87 
to remove the presumption. Likewise, a white male, or anyone else who 
is not presumed to be disadvantaged, can make an individual showing of 
social and economic disadvantage and participate in the program on the 
same basis as any other disadvantaged individual (see Sec. 26.67).

5. The ``Low-Bid System''

    SNPRM Comments: Non-DBE contractors expressed concern that a 
variety of provisions under the program and the SNPRM adversely 
affected the low-bid system, including contract goals, evaluation 
credits, and good faith efforts guidance concerning prime contractors' 
handling of subcontractor prices and consideration of other bidders' 
success in meeting goals.
    Congressional Debate: Opponents of the DBE program assert that the 
program results in white male contractors not receiving contracts they 
would otherwise expect to receive. Senator Sessions cited the statement 
of the Adarand company to this effect. (S1400). Senator Ashcroft said 
that ``if two bids come in from two subcontractors, one owned by a 
white male and the other by a racial minority, and the bids are the 
same, or even close, the job will go to the minority-owned company, not 
the low bidder.'' (S1405). Senator Gorton inserted into the record 
letters from a Spokane subcontractor asserting that, in a number of 
cases, it had lost subcontracts to DBE firms despite having a lower 
quote. (S1415-16). Representative Roukema also cited examples of firms 
who made similar assertions. (H2000).
    In contrast, DBE program proponents argued that the program was 
about leveling the playing field for DBEs. Senator Moseley-Braun cited 
letters from her constituents for the point that

    * * * the DBE program is not about taking away contracts from 
qualified male-owned businesses and handing them over to unqualified 
female-owned firms. The program is not about denying contracts to 
Caucasian low bidders in favor of higher bids that happen to have 
been submitted by Hispanics or African Americans or Asians or women. 
(S1420).

Without such a program, her constituents' letters said, they would lose 
the chance to compete. (Id.). Citing testimony from a Judiciary 
Committee hearing, Senator Kennedy noted that it was the experience of 
some DBEs that white male prime contractors had accepted higher bids 
from other firms to avoid working with DBEs. (S1430).

    Why would a general contractor accept a higher bid? It doesn't 
make sense unless you remember that the traditional business network 
doesn't include women or minorities * * * [A woman business owner 
testified] that some general contractors would rather lose money 
than deal with female contractors. (Id.)

    DOT Response: For the most part, statutory low-bid requirements 
exist only at the prime contracting level. That is, state and local 
governments, in awarding prime contracts, must select the low bidder in 
many procurements (there may be exceptions in some types of purchases). 
Nothing in this regulation requires, under any circumstances, a 
recipient to accept a higher bid for a prime contract from a DBE when a 
non-DBE has presented a lower bid. This rule does not interfere with 
recipients' implementation of state and local low-bid legislation.
    The selection of subcontractors by a prime contractor is typically 
not subject to any low-bid requirements under state or local law. Prime 
contractors have unfettered discretion to select any subcontractor they 
wish. Price is clearly a key factor, but nothing legally compels a 
prime contractor to hire the subcontractor who makes the lowest quote. 
Other factors, such as the prime

[[Page 5100]]

contractor's familiarity and experience with a subcontractor, the 
quality of a subcontractor's work, the word-of-mouth reputation of the 
subcontractor in the prime contracting community, or the prime's 
comfort or discomfort with dealing with a particular subcontractor can 
be as or more important than price in some situations. It is in this 
context that Sec. 26.53 requires that prime contractors make good faith 
efforts to achieve DBE contract goals. The rule does not require that 
recipients ignore price or quality, let alone obtain a certain amount 
of DBE participation without regard to other considerations. The good 
faith efforts requirements are intended to ensure that prime 
contractors cannot simply refuse to consider qualified, competitive DBE 
subcontractors. At the same time, the good faith efforts waiver of 
contract goals serves as a safeguard to ensure that prime contractors 
will not be forced into accepting an unreasonable or excessive quote 
from a DBE subcontractor.

6. Constitutionality

    SNPRM Comments: Non-DBE contractors and their groups argued that 
the SNPRM proposals, particularly with respect to overall goals and the 
use of race-conscious measures, failed to meet the Adarand narrow 
tailoring test. Many of these commenters said that the overall goals 
were suspect because they did not adequately consider the capacity of 
DBEs to perform contracts and Adarand requires that race-conscious 
measures may be used only after a recipient has demonstrated that race-
neutral means have failed. The use of presumptions based on racial 
classifications was viewed as intrinsically unconstitutional by these 
commenters, many of whom cited the language of Judge Kane's decision in 
the Adarand remand to this effect. Some commenters also contended that, 
absent recipient-specific findings of compelling need, the program 
could not be constitutional. They said that existing information 
alleging compelling interest--such as various disparity studies or 
information compiled by the Department of Justice--was inadequate to 
meet the compelling interest test. DBEs and recipients who commented 
defended the constitutionality of the program, often citing experience 
with discrimination in the marketplace and contending that the SNPRM 
succeeded in narrowly tailoring the program.
    Congressional Debate: Proponents and opponents of the DBE program 
extensively debated the constitutionality of the DBE statutory 
provision and the entire DBE program. Generally, opponents argued that 
the Supreme Court and District Court decisions in Adarand rendered the 
program unconstitutional, while proponents said that the decisions did 
not have that effect.
    Proponents and opponents of the DBE program agreed that the Supreme 
Court's Adarand decision established a two-part test for the 
constitutionality of a program that uses a racial classification. The 
program must be based on a compelling governmental interest and be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest (e.g., Senator McConnell, 
S1396; Senator Baucus, S1403). Opponents relied on the finding of a 
Colorado district court on remand that the program was not narrowly 
tailored and was thus unconstitutional (Senator McConnell, S 1396; 
Senator Ashcroft, S1405). Proponents replied that the remand decision 
represented the views of only one district court (Senator Baucus, 
S1403), that it failed to properly apply the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court decision with respect to narrow tailoring (Senator Domenici, 
S1425), and that the Department's forthcoming regulations would ensure 
that the program was narrowly tailored (see discussion below).
A. Compelling Interest
    (1) Existence of Discrimination. Proponents (and some opponents) of 
the DBE provision said that discrimination and/or disadvantage with 
respect to minorities and/or women persists. In the House, these 
included Representative Roukema (H2000-01), Representative Norton 
(H2003), Representative Poshard (H2003), Representative Menendez 
(H2004), Representative Davis of Illinois (H2005), Representative 
Boswell (H2005), Representative Lampson (H2006), Representative Kennedy 
(H2006), Representative Jackson-Lee (H2006), Representative Edwards 
(H2007), Representative Andrews (H2007), Representative Rodriguez 
(H2008), Representative Towns (H2010), Representative Dixon (H2010), 
and Representative Millender-McDonald (H2011). DBE opponents typically 
remained silent on this point, neither affirming nor denying the 
existence of discrimination against women and minorities.
    There was a similar pattern in the Senate debates. Opponents 
typically did not address the present existence of discrimination or 
disadvantage with respect to minorities and women or its continuing 
effects, spoke of such discrimination as something that existed in the 
past (Senator Sessions, S1399; Senator Hatch, S1411), or asserted that 
race-based disadvantage or discrimination no longer exists (Senator 
Ashcroft, S1406).
    The Senators who said that such discrimination persists included 
Senator Baucus (S1403, S1413, S1496), Senator Warner (S1403), Senator 
Kerry (S1408), Senator Wellstone (S1410), Senator Moseley-Braun (S1419-
20), Senator Robb (S1422); Senator Brownback (S1423-24), Senator 
Domenici (S1425-26), Senator Kennedy (S1429-30, S1482), Senator Specter 
(S1485), Senator McCain (S1489), Senator Lautenberg (S1490), Senator 
Durbin (S1491), Senator Daschle (S1492), Senator Lieberman (S1493), 
Senator Bingaman (S1494), Senator Murray (S1495), and Senator Dorgan 
(S1495).
    (2) Evidence of discrimination or disadvantage. In comments on the 
passage of the TEA-21 conference report in the Senate, Senator Chafee 
noted a Colorado Department of Transportation disparity study that 
found a disproportionately small number of women- and minority-owned 
contractors participating in that state's highway construction 
industry. More than 99 percent of contracts went to firms owned by 
white men. (Congressional Record, May 22, 1998; S5413). In the House 
discussion of the conference report, Representative Norton presented an 
extensive summary of relevant evidence of discrimination forming the 
basis for a compelling need for the DBE program. (H3957).
    Throughout the debate, the Members who affirmed the existence of 
discrimination and/or disadvantage asserted a number of factual bases 
for concluding that the DBE program was necessary. This information is 
largely drawn from the Senate debate; the briefer House debate contains 
less detail.
    Senator Baucus cited disparities between the earnings of women and 
men and between the percentage of small businesses women own and the 
percentage of Federal procurement dollars they receive. He also noted 
that minorities make up 20 percent of the population, own 9 percent of 
construction businesses, and get only 4 percent of construction 
receipts. (S1403). Finally, Senator Baucus, via a letter from the 
Associate Attorney General, cited to numerous Congressional findings 
concerning the effects of discrimination in the construction industry 
and in DOT-assisted programs. (S1413).
    Senator Kerry added that women own 9.2 percent of the nation's 
construction firms but their companies earn only about half of what is 
earned by male-owned firms. (S1409). Senator Robb

[[Page 5101]]

commented that the evidence of racially based disadvantage is 
``compelling and disturbing.'' He continued, stating that, ``White-
owned construction firms receive 50 times as many loan dollars as 
African-American owned firms that have identical equity.'' (S1422). 
Senator Kennedy said that the playing field for women and minorities 
and other victims of discrimination was still not level. Job 
discrimination against minorities and the ``glass ceiling'' for women 
still persisted, he said, adding that ``Nowhere is the deck stacked 
more heavily against women and minorities than in the construction 
industry.'' (S1429). He cited a number of instances in which minority 
or female contractors encountered overt discrimination in trying to get 
work. (S1429-30).
    Senator Lautenberg said that, for transportation-related contracts, 
minority-owned firms get only 61 cents for every dollar of work that 
white male-owned businesses receive. The comparable figure for women-
owned firms was 48 cents. He also mentioned that ``women-owned 
businesses have a lower rate of loan delinquency, yet still have far 
greater difficulty in obtaining loans.'' (S1490). He then spoke of the 
continuing effects of past discrimination:

    Jim Crow laws were wiped off the books over 30 years ago. 
However, their pernicious effects on the construction industry 
remain. Transportation construction has historically relied on the 
old boy network which, until the last decade, was almost exclusively 
a white, old boy network. * * * This is an industry that relies 
heavily on business friendships and relationships established 
decades, sometimes generations, ago--years before minority-owned 
firms were even allowed to compete. (Id.)

    Senator Durbin referred to recent studies concerning job bias 
against minorities and women. (S1491). Senator Lieberman referred 
generally to previous Congressional committee findings and testimony 
concerning still-existing barriers to full participation for minorities 
and women. (S1493). He also cited the May 1996 Department of Justice 
survey of discrimination and its effects in business and contracting. 
He referred to a recent study in Denver showing that African Americans 
were 3 times, and Hispanics 1.5 times, more likely than whites to be 
rejected for business loans. Senator Daschle summed up by saying, 
``[t]here is clearly a compelling interest in addressing the pervasive 
discrimination that has characterized the highway construction 
industry.'' (S1492).
    Throughout the portion of the debate described above, many of the 
Members stressed that goal-based programs like the DBE program were the 
only effective way to combat the continuing effects of discrimination.
    Senator Baucus cited the experience of Michigan, in which DBE 
participation in the state-funded portion of the highway program fell 
to zero in a nine-month period after the state terminated its DBE 
program, while the Federal DBE program in Michigan was able to maintain 
12.7 percent participation. (S1404). Senator Kerry also raised the 
Michigan example, and went on to cite similar sharp decreases in DBE 
participation when Louisiana, Hillsborough County, Florida, and San 
Jose, California, eliminated affirmative action programs covering 
state- and locally-funded programs. Senator Kerry asked rhetorically:

    * * * is that just the economy of our country speaking, an 
economy at one moment that is capable of having 12 percent and at 
another moment, where they lose the incentive to do so, to drop down 
to zero, to drop down by 99 percent, to drop down by 80 percent, to 
have .4 at the State level while at the Federal level there are 12 
percent? You could not have a more compelling interest if you tried. 
* * * (S1409-10).

    Senator Moseley-Braun added the examples of Arizona, Arkansas, 
Rhode Island, and Delaware to the jurisdictions cited by other members 
where state-funded projects without a DBE program have significantly 
less DBE participation than Federally funded projects subject to the 
DBE program. She added, ``Where there are no DBE programs, women- and 
minority-owned small businesses are shut out of highway construction.'' 
(S1420-21). Senator Kennedy added Nebraska, Missouri, Tampa and 
Philadelphia to the list of jurisdictions that experienced precipitous 
drops in DBE participation after goals programs ended. (S1429-30; 
S1482). He also cited comments from DBE companies that goal programs 
were needed to surmount discrimination-related barriers. (S1482). 
Senator Domenici repeated many of the same points as previous DBE 
proponents concerning the basis for concluding that the program was 
needed (S1426), as did Senator Kempthorne. (S1494).
    Senator Robb emphasized that the DBE program was essential to 
combating discrimination and ensuring economic opportunity, explicitly 
linking the fall-off in DBE participation to continuing discrimination:

    Where DBE programs at the State level have been eliminated, 
participation by qualified women and qualified minorities in 
government transportation contracts has plummeted. There is no way 
to know whether this discrimination is intentional or subconscious, 
but the effect is the same. This experience demonstrates the sad but 
inescapable truth that, when it comes to providing economic 
opportunities to women and minorities, passivity equals inequality. 
(S1422).

    3. Narrow tailoring.--DBE proponents cited the Department's 
proposed DBE rule as the vehicle that would ensure that the DBE program 
would be narrowly tailored. They cited features of the SNPRM including 
a new mechanism for calculation of overall goals, giving priority to 
race-neutral measures in meeting goals, a greater emphasis on good 
faith efforts, DBE diversification, added flexibility for recipients, 
net worth provisions, ability to challenge presumptions of social and 
economic disadvantage, and flexibility in goal-setting. In comments on 
the Senate consideration of the TEA-21 conference report, Senator 
Baucus concluded by saying:

    As I explained in my statements during the debate on the 
McConnell amendment * * * the program is narrowly tailored, both 
under the current and the new regulations, which emphasize flexible 
goals tied to the capacity of firms in the local market, the use of 
race-neutral measures, and the appropriate use of waivers for good 
faith efforts. (Congressional Record, May 22, 1998; S5414).

Following Senator Baucus' remarks, Senator Chafee, Chairman of the 
committee of jurisdiction, requested that he be associated with Senator 
Baucus' remarks on constitutionality. (S5414).
    DBE opponents denied that regulatory change could result in a 
narrowly tailored program. Senator Smith said ``The administration's 
attempt to comply with the Court's decision by fiddling around with the 
DOT regulations does not meet the constitutional litmus test.'' 
(S1398). The most frequent argument against the efficacy of regulatory 
change was that a racial classification is inherently unable to be 
narrowly tailored. (Senator Sessions, S1399-1400; Senator Ashcroft, 
S1407).
    DOT Response: The 1998 debate over DBE legislation was the most 
thorough in which Congress has engaged since the beginning of the 
program. The record of this debate clearly supports the Department's 
view that there is a compelling governmental interest in remedying 
discrimination and its effects in DOT-assisted contracting. Congress 
clearly determined that real, pervasive, and injurious discrimination 
exists. Congress backed up that determination with reference to a wide 
range of factual material, including private and public contracting, 
DOT-assisted and state-and locally-funded programs and the financing of 
the contracting industry. By retaining the DBE statutory provisions

[[Page 5102]]

against this factual background, Congress clearly found that there was 
a compelling governmental interest in having the program.
    The courts, including the court in the Adarand Constructors Inc. v. 
Pena, 965 F.Supp. 1556 (D. Colo., 1997) and the court in In re: 
Sherbrooke Sodding, 6-96-CV-41 (D. Minn. 1998), agree that Congress has 
the power to legislate on a nationwide basis to address nationwide 
problems. Congress has a unique role as the national legislature to 
look at the whole of the United States for the basis to find a 
compelling governmental interest supporting the use of race-based 
remedies. Congress is not required to make particularized findings of 
discrimination in individual localities to which a nationwide program 
may apply. Nor is Congress required to find that the Federal government 
itself has discriminated before applying a race-conscious remedy. (Id. 
at 1573).
    Having reviewed the extensive evidence of discrimination and its 
relationship to DOT-assisted contracting, the District Court in Adarand 
determined that current and previous DBE provisions were a ``considered 
response by Congress to the effects of discrimination on the ability of 
minorities to participate in the mainstream of federal contracting.'' 
(Id. at 1576). The court stated that ``Congress has a strong basis in 
evidence for enacting the challenged statutes, which thus serve a 
`compelling governmental interest.' '' (Id. at 1577). The extensive 
Congressional debate and information supporting the enactment of the 
1998 DBE provision significantly strengthens the existing basis for 
declaring that this program serves a compelling governmental interest.
    The basis for District Court's view that the program at issue in 
Adarand is unconstitutional is stated most clearly in the following 
passage:

    Contrary to the [Supreme] Court's pronouncement that strict 
scrutiny is not `fatal in fact,' I find it difficult to envisage a 
race-based classification that is narrowly tailored. By its very 
nature, such [a] program is both underinclusive and overinclusive. 
(Id. at 1580).

By underinclusive, the court said it meant that caucasians and members 
of non-designated minority groups are excluded. By overinclusive, it 
said it meant that all the members of the designated groups are 
presumed to be economically and/or socially disadvantaged, without 
Congress having inquired whether a particular entity seeking a racial 
preference has suffered from the effects of past discrimination (citing 
the Supreme Court's Croson decision, which concerned the powers of 
state and local governments to use race-based remedies). (Id.)
    As Senator Domenici pointed out (S1425), the key words in the 
District Court's opinion are ``Contrary to the [Supreme] Court's 
pronouncement. * * *'' The District Court's analysis departs markedly 
from the controlling decision of the Supreme Court on this issue 
(Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)). The Supreme Court's language 
with which the District Court disagreed is the following:

    Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 
``strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'' [citation omitted] The 
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects 
of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is 
an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from 
acting in response to it * * * When race-based action is necessary 
to further a compelling interest, such action is within 
constitutional constraints if it satisfies the ``narrow tailoring'' 
test this Court has set out in previous cases. (515 U.S. at 237).

The Supreme Court evidently considers the ``not fatal in fact'' 
language to have continuing vitality, having cited it in a subsequent 
case (U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, note 6 (1996)).
    Under the District Court's analysis, Congress could never use a 
race-based classification, no matter how compelling the need, because 
any such classification would intrinsically fail to be narrowly 
tailored. This approach effectively moots the determination of whether 
there is a compelling governmental interest. The Supreme Court's 
approach, by contrast, permits a racial classification to be used, 
given the existence of a compelling interest, if it is narrowly 
tailored.
    What is the test for narrow tailoring? As set forth in United 
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987), the test includes several 
factors: ``the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative 
remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the 
availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of the goals to the 
relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights of 
third parties.'' In Adarand, the Supreme Court specifically invited 
inquiry into whether there was any consideration of the use of race-
neutral means to increase minority business participation (related to 
the efficacy of alternative remedies) and whether the program was 
appropriately limited so that it will not last longer than the 
discrimination it is designed to eliminate (related to the duration of 
relief). (515 U.S. at 238).
    This final rule successfully addresses each element of this test:
    <bullet> The necessity of relief. Throughout the debate on the 
compelling governmental interest, the bipartisan majority of both 
houses of Congress repeatedly described the necessity of the DBE 
program's goal-based approach to remedying the effects of 
discrimination in DOT-assisted contracting. The most significant 
evidence demonstrating the necessity of a goal-oriented program is the 
evidence cited of the fall-off in DBE participation in state 
contracting when goal-oriented programs end, compared to participation 
rates in the Federal DBE program.
    <bullet> Efficacy of alternative remedies. This element of the 
narrow tailoring standard is related to the Supreme Court's inquiry 
concerning race-neutral programs. Under Sec. 26.51 of this rule, 
recipients are required to meet the maximum feasible portion of their 
overall goals by using race-neutral measures. Recipients are not 
required to have contract goals on each contract. Instead, they are 
instructed to use contract goals only for any portion of their overall 
goal they cannot meet through race-neutral measures. Contract goals are 
intended as a safety net to be used when race-neutral means are not 
effective to ensure that a recipient can achieve ``level playing 
field.'' Moreover, the regulations provide that recipients must reduce 
the use of contract goals when other means are sufficient to meet their 
overall goals. This ensures that race-conscious relief is used only to 
the extent necessary and is replaced by race-neutral as quickly as 
possible.
    <bullet> Flexibility of relief. Flexibility is built into the 
program in a variety of ways. Recipients set their own goals, based on 
local market conditions; their goals are not imposed by the federal 
government nor do recipients have to tie them to any uniform national 
percentage. (Sec. 26.45). Recipients also choose their own method for 
goal setting and can choose to base the goal on the evidence that they 
believe best reflects their market conditions. (Sec. 26.45). Recipients 
have broad discretion to choose whether or not to use a goal on any 
given contract, and if they do choose to use a contract goal, they are 
free to set it at any level they believe is appropriate for the type 
and location of the specific work involved. (Sec. 26.51). The rule also 
ensures flexibility for contractors by requiring that any contract goal 
be waived entirely for a prime contractor that demonstrates that it 
made good faith efforts but was still unable to meet the goal. 
(Sec. 26.53). The rule also allows recipients that believe they can 
achieve equal opportunity for DBEs through different approaches to get 
waivers releasing

[[Page 5103]]

them from almost any of the specific requirements of the rule. 
(Sec. 26.103). Recipients can also get exemptions from the rule if they 
have unique circumstances that make complying with the rule 
impractical. (Sec. 26.103).
    <bullet> Duration of relief. The TEA-21 DBE program will end in 
2004 unless reauthorized by the Congress. In each successive 
reauthorization bill for the surface transportation and airport 
programs, Congress will have the opportunity to examine the current 
state of transportation contracting and determine whether the DBE 
program statutes are still necessary to remedy the continuing effects 
of discrimination. In addition, the duration of relief for individuals 
and firms are limited by the personal net worth threshold and business 
size caps. When an individual's personal wealth grows beyond the 
threshold, he or she will lose the presumption of disadvantage. 
(Sec. 26.67). Similarly, when a firm's receipts grows beyond the small 
business size standards, it loses its eligibility to participate in the 
program. (Sec. 26.65). Finally, to ensure that race-conscious remedies 
are not used any longer than absolutely necessary, Sec. 26.51 requires 
recipients to reduce the use of contract goals and rely on race-neutral 
measures to the extent that they are effective.
    <bullet> Relationship of goals to the relevant market. The overall 
goal setting provisions of Sec. 26.45 require that recipient set 
overall goals based on demonstrable evidence of the relative 
availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in the areas from which 
each recipient obtains contractors. These provisions ensure that there 
is as close a fit as possible between the goals set by each recipient 
and the realities of its relevant market. When a recipient sets 
contract goals, Sec. 26.51 provides that these goals are to be set 
realistically in relation to the availability of DBEs for the type and 
location of work involved.
    <bullet> Impact of relief on the rights of third parties. The 
legitimate interests of third parties (e.g., prime contractors, non-DBE 
subcontractors) are only minimally impacted by the DBE program, since 
the program is aimed at replicating a market in which there are no 
effects of discrimination and the program affects only a relatively 
small percentage of total federal-aid funds. The design of the overall 
and contract goal provisions ensures that the use of race-conscious 
remedies having the potential to affect the interests of third parties 
is limited to the extent necessary to counter the effects of 
discrimination. Individual prime contractors are further protected from 
suffering any undue burdens by Sec. 26.51, which prevents a prime 
contractor from losing a contract if it made good faith efforts but was 
still unable to meet a goal. Non-DBE firms are also protected by 
Sec. 26.33, which directs recipients to take appropriate steps to 
address areas of overconcentration of DBE firms in certain types of 
work that could unduly burden non-DBE firms seeking the same type of 
work.
    <bullet> Inclusion of appropriate beneficiaries. The certification 
provisions of Subparts D and E, and particularly the social and 
economic disadvantage provisions of Sec. 26.67, ensure that only firms 
owned and controlled by individuals who are in fact socially and 
economically disadvantaged can participate in the program. Eligibility 
provisions guard against overinclusiveness by ensuring that individuals 
with too great net worth are not presumed disadvantaged and by 
permitting the recipient--on its own initiative or as the result of a 
complaint--to follow procedures to rebut the presumption of social and/
or economic disadvantage. They guard against underinclusiveness by 
permitting any business owner, including a white male, to demonstrate 
social and economic disadvantage on an individual basis.

Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 26.1  What Are the Objectives of This Part?

    There were relatively few comments on this section of the SNPRM, 
most of which agreed with the proposed language. We have adopted the 
suggestion of some commenters that specific reference be made to the 
role of the DBE program in helping DBEs overcome barriers (e.g., access 
to capital and bonding) to equal participation. We have also added a 
specific reference to the role of the program in creating a level 
playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly for DOT-assisted 
contracts. Some non-DBE contractors urged that language be added to 
explicitly oppose ``reverse discrimination.'' The rule clearly states 
that nondiscrimination is the program's first objective and the 
Department reiterates here that it opposes unlawful discrimination of 
any kind.

Section 26.3  To Whom Does This Part Apply?

    This provision is unchanged from the SNPRM, except for references 
to the new TEA-21 statutory provisions. A few commenters wanted this 
provision to apply to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs, 
as did the original version of former part 23. However, FRA does not 
have specific statutory authority for a DBE program parallel to the 
TEA-21 language. One commenter asked if the language saying that DBE 
requirements do not apply to contracts without any DOT funding is 
inconsistent with Federal Transit Administration (FTA) guidance on 
applicability. While the structure of the FTA program is such that FTA 
funds are commingled with local funds in many transit authority 
contracts (e.g., any contract involving FTA operating assistance 
funds), to which DBE requirements would apply, a contract which is 
funded entirely with local funds--and without any Federal funds--would 
not be subject to requirements under this rule.

Section 26.5  What Do The Terms Used in This Part Mean?

    There were relatively few comments on the definitions proposed in 
the SNPRM. One commenter wanted to substitute the term ``historically 
underutilized business'' for DBE. Given the continued use of the DBE 
term in Congressional consideration of the program, the continued use 
of the ``socially and economically disadvantaged individuals'' language 
in the statute, and the familiarity of concerned parties with the DBE 
term, we do not believe changing the term would be a good idea.
    A few commenters asked for additional definitions or elaboration of 
existing definitions (e.g., ``form of arrangement,'' ``financial 
assistance program,'' ``commercially useful function''). These terms 
are either already defined sufficiently or are best understood in 
context of the operational sections in which they are embedded, and 
abstract definitions in this section would not add much to anyone's 
ability to make the program work well. Consequently, we are not adding 
them. Otherwise the final rule adopts the SNPRM proposals for 
definitions with only minor editorial changes.
    The Department has added, for the sake of clarity and consistency 
with other Federal programs, definitions of the terms Alaskan native, 
Alaskan native corporation (ANC), Indian tribe, immediate family 
member, Native Hawaiian, Native Hawaiian organization, principal place 
of business, primary industry classification, and tribally-owned 
concern. These definitions are taken from the SBA's new small 
disadvantaged business program regulation (13 CFR Sec. 124.3). The 
definitions of the designated groups included in the definition of 
``socially

[[Page 5104]]

and economically disadvantaged individual'' also derive from the SBA 
regulations, as the Department's DBE statutes require. We believe these 
will be useful terms of art in implementing the DBE program.
    A few commenters requested definitions for the terms ``race-
conscious'' and ``race-neutral,'' and we have provided definitions. A 
race-conscious program is one that focuses on, and provides benefits 
only for, DBEs. The use of contract goals is the primary example of a 
race-conscious measure in the DBE program. A race-neutral program is 
one that, while benefiting DBEs, is not solely focused on DBE firms. 
For example, small business outreach programs, technical assistance 
programs, and prompt payment clauses can assist a wide variety of small 
businesses, not just DBEs.

Section 26.7  What Discriminatory Actions Are Forbidden?

    One commenter wanted to add prohibitions of discrimination based on 
age, disability and religion. The Department is not doing so, because 
discrimination on these grounds is already prohibited by other statutes 
(e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act with respect to disability). 
Also, statutes which form the basis for this rule focus on race, color, 
national origin, and sex. Congress determined that remedial action 
focused on these areas is necessary. These grounds for discrimination 
are also most relevant to problems in the DBE program that have been 
alleged to exist (e.g., disparate treatment of DBE certification 
applicants by race or sex). Some opponents of the program said that the 
DBE program discriminates against non-DBEs. However, the Department 
believes that the program is constitutional and does not violate equal 
protection requirements. A reference to DOT Title VI regulations has 
been deleted as unnecessary; otherwise, this provision is the same as 
in the SNPRM.

Section 26.9  How Does the Department Issue Guidance and 
Interpretations Under This Part?

    Commenters, most of whom were recipients, focused on two issues in 
this section. First, a majority of the comments favored the 
``coordination mechanism'' concept for ensuring consistent DOT guidance 
and interpretations. The few that disagreed with this approach did so 
out of a concern that the mechanism would add delays to the process. 
These commenters favored additional training or an 800 number hot line 
to speed up the process.
    We believe that proper coordination of interpretations and guidance 
is vital to the successful implementation of this rule. As the 
preambles to the 1992 and 1997 proposed rules mentioned, inconsistent 
implementation of part 23 has been a continuing problem, which has been 
criticized by a General Accounting Office report and which has created 
unnecessary difficulty for recipients, contractors, and the Department 
itself. A process for ensuring that the Department speaks with one 
voice on DBE implementation matters, and for letting the public know 
when DOT has spoken, will greatly improve the service we give our 
customers.
    We do not believe this coordination process will result in 
significant delays in providing guidance. Nor will it inhibit the 
ability of DOT staff and customers to communicate with one another. For 
example, the process does not apply to informal advice provided by 
staff to recipients or contractors over the phone or in a letter or e-
mail. It does maintain, however, the important distinction between 
informal staff assistance on one hand and a binding institutional 
position on the other.
    For clarity in the process, we have modified the language of the 
rule text to make clear that interpretations and guidance are binding, 
official Departmental positions if the Secretary signs them or if the 
document includes a statement that they have been reviewed and approved 
by the General Counsel. The General Counsel will consult fully with all 
concerned offices as part of this review process.
    We intend to post significant guidance documents and 
interpretations on the Department's web site to make them widely and 
quickly available. As some commenters suggested, we are also continuing 
to consider forming an advisory committee (or working group of an 
existing committee) to facilitate customer input into DBE program 
matters. This is separate from the coordination mechanism, however, 
which is an internal DOT process.
    The rule's provisions regarding exemptions and waivers, previously 
found in the SNPRM's Sec. 26.9 (c) and (d), are now included as a 
separate section at Sec. 26.15.

Section 26.11  What Records do Recipients Keep and Report?

    The Department asked, in the SNPRM, whether it would be advisable 
to have one standard reporting form for information about the DBE 
program. Currently, each operating administration (OA) has its own 
reporting form and requirements. Virtually all the commenters that 
addressed this issue favored a single, DOT-wide reporting form. 
Commenters also had a wide variety of suggestions for what data should 
be reported, formats, and retention periods.
    The Department is adopting the suggestion of having a single 
reporting form, which we believe will reduce administrative burdens for 
recipients, particularly those who receive funds from more than one OA. 
Because we do not want to delay the issuance of this rule while a form 
is being developed, we are reserving the date on which this single form 
requirement will go into effect. We will take comments on the specifics 
of reporting into account and consult with interested parties as we 
devise the form, which will be published subsequently in Appendix B to 
this rule. The Appendix will also address the issues of reporting 
frequency and record retention periods. Meanwhile, recipients will 
continue to report as directed by the concerned OA(s), using existing 
reporting forms.
    The rule is also adding a requirement that recipients develop and 
maintain a ``bidders'' list. The bidders list is intended to be a count 
of all firms that are participating, or attempting to participate, on 
DOT-assisted contracts. The list must include all firms that bid on 
prime contracts or bid or quote subcontracts on DOT-assisted projects, 
including both DBEs and non-DBEs. Bidders lists appear to be a 
promising method for accurately determining the availability of DBE and 
non-DBE firms and the Department believes that developing bidders data 
will be useful for recipients. Creating and maintaining a bidders list 
will give recipients another valuable way to measure the relative 
availability of ready, willing and able DBEs when setting their overall 
goals. (See Sec. 26.45). We realize that identifying subcontractors, 
particularly non-DBEs and all subcontractors that were unsuccessful in 
their attempts to obtain contracts, may well be a difficult task for 
many recipients. Mindful of that potential burden, the rule will not 
impose any procedural requirements for how the data is collected. 
Recipients are free to choose whether or not they wish to gather this 
data through their existing bidding and reporting processes. Recipients 
are encouraged to make use of all of the data already available to them 
and all methods of reporting and communication with their contracting 
community that they already have in place. In addition, the Department 
suggests that recipients consider using a widely publicized public 
notice or a

[[Page 5105]]

widely disseminated survey to encourage all firms that have bid or 
quoted contracts to make themselves known to recipients.
    Once recipients have created the list of bidders, they will have to 
supplement that information with the age of each firm (since 
establishment) and the annual gross receipts of the firm (or an average 
of its annual gross receipts). Recipients can gather this additional 
information by sending a questionnaire to the firms on the list, or by 
any other means that the recipient believes will yield reliable 
information. The recipient's plan for how to create and maintain the 
list and gather the required information must be included in its DBE 
program.

Section 26.13  What Assurances Must Recipients and Contractors Make?

    There were few comments on this section. Most of these supported 
the proposal. One comment suggested specific mention of prompt payment, 
but in view of the substantive requirements on this subject, we do not 
believe such a mention is needed. Some commenters favored requiring 
additional public participation as part of the assurance for 
recipients. Again, given substantive provisions of this rule concerning 
public participation, we do not believe that repetition here is needed. 
One commenter said that incorporating the requirements of part 26 in 
the contract was confusing, since many provisions of part 26 apply only 
to recipients. We have rewritten the assurance for contractors in 
response to this concern, specifying that contractors are responsible 
only for carrying out the requirements of part 26 that apply to them.

Section 26.15  How Can Recipients Apply for Exemptions or Waivers?

    There has been some confusion as to this rule's distinction between 
exemption and waiver. Put simply, exemptions are for unique situations 
that are most likely not to be either generally applicable to all 
recipients or to have been contemplated in the rulemaking process. If 
such a situation occurs and it makes it impractical for a particular 
recipient to comply with a provision of part 26, the recipient should 
apply for an exemption from that provision. The waiver provision, by 
contrast, is not designed for extraordinary circumstances where a 
recipient may not be able to comply with part 26. Waiver is for a 
situation where a recipient believes that it can better accomplish the 
objectives of the DBE program through means other than the specific 
provisions of part 26.
    There were a number of comments about the proposed program waiver 
provision. Most commenters on this issue favored the proposal, 
believing it could add flexibility to the way recipients implement the 
DBE program. A few commenters were concerned that too liberal use of 
the waiver provision might undermine the goals of the rule.
    The Department believes that the waiver provision is an important 
aspect of the DBE program. The provision ensures that the Department 
and a recipient can work together to respond to any unique local 
circumstances. Recipients are encouraged to carefully review the 
circumstances in their own jurisdictions to determine what mechanisms 
are best suited to achieving compliance with the overall objectives of 
the DBE program. If a recipient believes it is appropriate to operate 
its program differently from the way that a provision of Subpart B or C 
provides, including, but not limited to, any provisions regarding 
administrative requirements, overall or contract goals, good faith 
efforts or counting provisions, it can apply for a waiver. For example, 
waiver requests could pertain to such subjects as the use of a race-
conscious measure other than a contract goal, different ways of 
counting DBE participation in certain industries, use of separate 
overall or contract goals to address demonstrated discrimination 
against specific categories of socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals, the use or wording of assurances, differences in 
information collection requirements and methods, etc.
    The Department will, of course, carefully review any applications 
for waivers to make sure that innovative state or local programs are 
able to meet the objectives of the statutes and regulation. Decisions 
on waiver requests are made by the Secretary. This authority has not 
been delegated to other officials. The waiver provision, which the 
Department believes will help assist recipients to ``narrowly tailor'' 
the program to state and local circumstances and ensure 
nondiscrimination, remains in the final rule.

Section 26.21  Who Must Have a DBE Program?

    The only substantive comment concerning this provision asked that 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) programs be included. The 
Department is not including FRA programs under this rule because FRA 
does not have a specific DBE program statute parallel to those covering 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FTA, and FHWA. FRA could 
consider issuing a rule similar to part 26 under its own, separate 
statutory authority. The Department shortened paragraph (b)(1) to make 
it easier to understand. Within 180 days of the effective date of this 
rule, all recipients with existing programs must submit revised 
programs to the relevant OA for approval. The only changes from 
existing programs that recipients would have to make are changes needed 
to accommodate differences between former part 23 and part 26. Future 
new recipients would, of course, submit a DBE program as part of the 
approval process for financial assistance.

Section 26.23  What is the Requirement for a Policy Statement?

Section 26.25  What is the Requirement for a Liaison Officer?

Section 26.27  What Efforts Must Recipients Make Concerning DBE 
Financial Institutions?

    There were no substantive comments concerning Secs. 26.23-26.27, 
and the Department is adopting them as proposed.

Section 26.29  What Prompt Payment Mechanisms Must Recipients Have?

    There was substantial comment on the issue of prompt payment. A 
majority of commenters supported the concept of prompt payment 
provisions. Some recipients pointed out that they already had prompt 
payment provisions on the books. DBEs generally supported mandating 
prompt payment provisions though they, as well as other commenters, 
recognized that slow payment is a problem affecting many 
subcontractors, not just DBEs. Some of these comments suggested making 
prompt payment requirements applicable to subcontracts in general, not 
just DBE subcontracts. Some recipients were concerned about getting in 
the middle of disputes between prime contractors and subcontractors. 
Some commenters wanted the Department to mandate prompt payment 
provisions, while others preferred that their use by recipients remain 
optional.
    Having considered the variety of views expressed on this subject, 
the Department believes that prompt payment provisions are an important 
race-neutral mechanism that can benefit DBEs and all other small 
businesses. Under part 26, all recipients must include a provision in 
their contracts requiring prime contractors to make prompt payments to 
their subcontractors, DBE and non-DBE alike. It is clear that DBE 
subcontractors are significantly--and, to the extent that

[[Page 5106]]

they tend to be smaller than non-DBEs, disproportionately--affected by 
late payments from prime contractors. Lack of prompt payment 
constitutes a very real barrier to the ability of DBEs to compete in 
the marketplace. It is appropriate for the Department to require 
recipients to take reasonable steps to deal with this barrier. We 
recognize that delayed payments do not affect only DBE contractors; a 
prompt payment requirement applying to all subcontracts is an excellent 
example of a race-neutral measure that will assist DBEs, and we are 
therefore requiring that recipients' prompt payment mechanisms apply to 
all subcontracts on Federally-assisted contracts.
    Paragraph (a) of this section requires recipients to put into their 
DBE programs a requirement for a prompt payment contract clause. This 
clause would appear in every prime contract on which there are 
subcontracting possibilities, and it would obligate the prime 
contractor to pay subcontractors within a given number of days from the 
receipt of each payment the recipient makes to the prime contractor. 
Payment is required only for satisfactory completion of the 
subcontractor's work. The clause would also apply to the return of 
retainage from the prime to the subcontractor. Retainage would have to 
be returned within a given number of days from the time the 
subcontractor's work had been satisfactorily completed, even if the 
prime contract had not yet been completed. A majority of commenters on 
the retainage issue favored a requirement of this kind.
    The number of days involved would be selected by the recipient, 
subject to OA approval as part of the recipient's DBE program. In 
approving these time frames, the OAs will consider whether they are 
realistic and sufficiently brief to ensure genuinely prompt payment. 
Recipients who already operate under prompt payment statutes may use 
their existing authority in implementing this requirement. It may be 
necessary to add to existing contract clauses in some cases (e.g., if 
existing prompt payment requirements do not cover retainage).
    Paragraph (b) lists a series of additional measures that the 
regulation authorizes, but does not require, recipients to use. These 
include alternative dispute resolution, holding of payments to primes 
until subcontractors are paid, and other mechanisms that the recipient 
may devise. All these mechanisms could be made part of the recipient's 
DBE programs.

Section 26.31  What Requirements Pertain to the DBE Directory?

    Recipients maintain directories listing certified DBEs. The issue 
most discussed by commenters on this section was whether the directory 
should include material concerning the qualifications of the firm to do 
various sorts of work. For example, has the firm been pre-qualified by 
the recipient? Can it do creditable work? What kinds of work does the 
firm prefer to do? Some commenters also asked that the directory should 
list the geographical areas in which the firm is willing to work. Other 
commenters opposed the idea of including this kind of information in 
the directory.
    The Department believes that the directory and the certification 
process are closely intertwined. The primary purpose of the directory 
is to show the results of the certification process. Consequently, the 
directory should list all firms that the recipient has certified, along 
with basic identifying information for the firm. Since certification 
under this rule pertains to the various kinds of work a firm's 
disadvantaged owners can control, it is important to list those kinds 
of work in the directory. For example, if a firm seeks to work in 
fields A, B, and C, but the recipient has determined that its 
disadvantaged owners can control its operations only with respect to A 
and B, then the directory would recite that the firm is certified to 
perform work as a DBE in fields A and B.
    The focus of the directory is intended to be eligibility. A 
directory is a list of firms that have been certified as eligible DBEs, 
with sufficient identifying information to permit interested firms to 
contact the DBEs. We do not intend to turn a recipient's directory into 
a comprehensive business resource manual. For example, information 
about firms' qualifications, geographical preferences for work, 
performance track record, capitalization, etc. are not required to be 
part of the directory. Some commenters favored including one or more of 
these elements, but we are concerned that other business information--
however useful in its own right--could clutter up the directory and 
dilute its focus on certification.

Section 26.33  What Steps Must a Recipient Take to Address 
Overconcentration of DBEs in Certain Types of Work?

    For some time, the Department has heard allegations that DBEs are 
overconcentrated in certain fields of highway construction work (e.g., 
guardrail, fencing, landscaping, traffic control, striping). The 
concern expressed is that there are so many DBEs in these areas that 
non-DBEs are frozen out of the opportunity to work. In an attempt to 
respond to these concerns, the SNPRM asked for comment on a series of 
options for ``diversification'' mechanisms, various incentives and 
disincentives designed to shift DBE participation to other types of 
work.
    The Department received a great deal of comment on these proposals, 
almost all of it negative. There were few comments suggesting that 
overconcentration was a serious problem, and many comments said that 
the alleged problem was not real. Some FTA and FAA recipients said that 
if there was a problem with overconcentration, it was limited to the 
highway construction program. As a general matter, recipients said that 
the proposed mechanisms were costly, cumbersome, and too prescriptive.
    Prime contractors opposed the provisions because they would make it 
more difficult for them to find DBEs with which to meet their goals, 
while DBEs opposed them because they felt the provisions would penalize 
success and force them out of areas of business in which they were 
experienced. Many commenters suggested using outreach or business 
development plans as ways of assisting DBEs to move into additional 
areas of work.
    The Department does not have data from commenters or other sources 
to support a finding that ``overconcentration'' is a serious, 
nationwide problem. However, as part of the narrow tailoring of the DBE 
program, we believe it would be useful to give recipients the authority 
to address overconcentration problems where they may occur. In keeping 
with the increased flexibility that this rule provides recipients, we 
give recipients discretion to identify situations where 
overconcentration is unduly burdening non-DBE firms. If a recipient 
finds an area of overconcentration, it would have to devise means of 
addressing the problem that work in their local situations. Possible 
means of dealing with the problem could include assisting prime 
contractors to find DBEs in non-traditional fields or varying the use 
of contract goals to lessen any burden on particular types of non-DBE 
specialty contractors. While recipients would have to obtain DOT 
approval of determinations of overconcentration and measures for 
dealing with them, the Department is not prescribing any specific 
mechanisms for doing so.

[[Page 5107]]

Section 26.35  What Role do Business Development and Mentor-Protege 
Programs Have in the DBE Program?

    In the SNPRM, both mentor-protege programs and business development 
programs (BDPs) were cast as tools to use for diversification. They 
still may be used for that purpose, as noted in Sec. 26.33. However, 
the Department believes that they may have a broader application, and 
their use in the final rule is not limited to diversification purposes. 
BDPs, in particular, are good examples of race-neutral methods 
recipients can use to promote the participation of DBEs and other small 
businesses in their contracting programs.
    There were few comments on these provisions. Recipients wanted 
flexibility, and suggested that these kinds of programs should be 
optional. Their comments said that such programs were resource-
intensive, and that Federal financial assistance for them would be 
welcome. One contractors' organization offered its own mentor-protege 
plan as a model. A few comments voiced suspicion of mentor-protege 
plans, on the basis that they allowed fronts and frauds into the 
program.
    The final rule makes the use of BDPs and mentor-protege programs 
optional for recipients. An operating administration can direct a 
particular recipient to institute a BDP, but BDPs are not mandatory 
across the board. The operating administration would negotiate with the 
recipient before mandating a BDP.
    One feature added to this provision allows recipients to establish 
a kind of mini-graduation requirement for firms that voluntarily 
participate in BDPs. One of the purposes of a BDP is to equip DBE firms 
to compete in the market outside the DBE program. Therefore, a 
recipient could ask BDP participants to agree--as a condition of 
receiving BDP assistance--to agree to leave the DBE program after a 
certain number of years, or after certain business development 
objectives had been achieved.
    Standing alone, mentor-protege programs are not an adequate 
substitute for the DBE program. While they can be an important tool to 
help selected firms, they cannot be counted on to level the playing 
field for DBEs in general. An effective mentor-protege program requires 
close monitoring to guard against abuse, which further limits the 
number of DBEs they can assist. Even with these limits, a mentor-
protege program that has safeguards to prevent large non-DBE firms from 
circumventing the DBE program can be a useful component of a 
recipient's overall strategy to ensure equal opportunities for DBEs.
    The final rule includes safeguards intended to prevent the misuse 
of mentor-protege programs. Only firms that a recipient has already 
certified as DBEs (necessarily including a determination that they are 
independent firms) can participate as proteges. This is intended to 
preclude non-DBE firms from creating captive DBE firms to serve as 
proteges. A non-DBE mentor firm cannot get credit for more than half 
its goal on any contract by using its own protege. Moreover, a non-DBE 
mentor firm cannot get DBE credit for using its own protege on more 
than every other contract performed by the protege. That is, if Mentor 
Firm X uses Protege Firm Y to perform a subcontract, X cannot get DBE 
credit for using Y on another subcontract until Y had first worked on 
an intervening prime contract or subcontract with a different prime 
contractor.
    To make mentor-protege relationships feasible, the rule provides 
that mentors and proteges are not treated as affiliates of one another 
for size determination purposes. Mentor-protege programs and BDPs must 
be approved by the concerned operating administration before they take 
effect. Recipients who already have such programs in place would make 
them part of their revised DBE programs sent to the concerned OA within 
180 days of the effective date of part 26.

Section 26.37  What Are a Recipient's Responsibilities for Monitoring 
the Performance of Other Program Participants?

    The few comments on this section asked for more detail and 
clarification. In the interest of flexibility, the Department is 
reluctant to be prescriptive in the matter of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms. What we are looking for is a strong and 
effective set of monitoring and compliance provisions in each 
recipient's DBE program. These mechanisms could be most anything 
available to the recipient under Federal, state, or local law (e.g., 
liquidated damages provisions, responsibility determinations, 
suspension and debarment rules, etc.)
    One of the main purposes of these provisions is to make sure that 
DBEs actually perform work committed to them at contract award. The 
results that recipients must measure consist of payments actually made 
to DBEs, not just promises at the award stage. Credit toward goals can 
be awarded only when payments (including, for example, the return of 
retainage payments) are actually made to DBEs. Under the final rule, 
recipients would keep a running tally of the extent to which, on each 
contract, performance had matched promises. Prime contractors whose 
performance fell short of original commitments would be subject to the 
compliance mechanisms the recipient had made applicable.

Section 26.41  What Is the Role of the Statutory 10 Percent Goal in 
This Program?

    This is a new section, intended to explain what role the 10 percent 
statutory goal plays in the DBE program. Under former part 23, the 10 
percent figure derived from the statute had a role in the setting of 
overall goals by recipients. For example, if recipients had a goal of 
less than 10 percent, the rule required them to make a special 
justification.
    This section makes clear that the 10 percent goal is an 
aspirational goal that applies to the Department of Transportation on a 
national level, not to individual recipients. It is a goal that the 
Department can use to evaluate its overall national success in 
achieving the objectives that Congress has established for this 
program. However, the national 10 percent goal is not tied to 
recipients' goal-setting decisions. Recipients set goals based on what 
will achieve a level playing field for DBEs in their own programs, 
without regard to the national goal. Recipients are not required to set 
their overall or contract goals at 10 percent or any other particular 
level. Recipients are no longer required to make a special 
justification if their overall goals are less than 10 percent.
    As discussed in connection with the Congressional debate on the 
TEA-21 DBE provision, Congress viewed flexibility concerning the 
statutory 10 percent goal as an important feature of narrow tailoring 
and made clear that it was setting a national goal, not a goal for any 
individual recipient. The Department wants to ensure that state and 
local programs have sufficient flexibility to implement their programs 
in a narrowly tailored way. This section is part of the Department's 
effort toward that end.

Section 26.43  Can Recipients Use Quotas or Set-Asides as Part of This 
Program?

    The DBE program has often been labeled as a ``quota'' or ``set-
aside'' program, especially, though not exclusively, by its opponents. 
This label is, and always has been, incorrect. Fifteen years ago, in 
the preamble to the Department's first rule implementing a DBE statute, 
the Department carefully

[[Page 5108]]

specified that neither quotas nor set-asides were required (see 48 FR 
33437-38; July 21, 1983). This remains true today. However, in light of 
Adarand and this year's Congressional debates on the DBE statutes, we 
believe this point deserves additional emphasis. This regulation 
prohibits quotas under any circumstances and makes clear that set-
asides can only be used as a means of last resort for redressing 
egregious discrimination.
    A number of non-DBE contractors and their organizations continued 
to assert, in comments on the SNPRM, that the DBE program operates as a 
quota program. This section makes clear that recipients cannot use 
quotas on DOT-assisted contracts under any circumstances. A quota is a 
simple numerical requirement that a recipient or contractor must meet, 
without consideration of other factors. For example, if a recipient 
sets a 12 percent goal on a particular contract and refuses to award 
the contract to any bidder who does not have 12 percent DBE 
participation, either refusing to look at showings of good faith 
efforts or arbitrarily disregarding them, then the recipient has used a 
quota. The Department's regulations have never endorsed this practice. 
The issue of good faith efforts is discussed further below in 
connection with Sec. 26.51.
    A set-aside is a very specific tool. A contracting agency sets a 
contract aside for DBEs if it permits no one but DBEs to compete for 
the contract. Firms other than DBEs are not eligible to bid. The 
Department's DBE program has never required the use of set-asides and 
has allowed recipients to use set-asides only under very limited 
circumstances.
    Under the SNPRM, a recipient could use a set-aside on a DOT-
assisted contract only if other methods of meeting overall goals were 
demonstrated to be unavailing and the recipient had legal authority 
independent of part 26. Comments were divided concerning the use of 
set-asides. A number of non-DBE contractors opposed the use of set-
asides, some of them saying that set-asides might be something they 
could live with if their use were balanced by the elimination of DBE 
contract goals on other contracts in the same field. Some recipients 
and DBEs said, however, that set-asides were a useful tool to achieve 
goals, particularly for start-up contractors or small contracts.
    The Department has carefully reviewed these comments and continues 
to believe that set-asides should not be used in the DBE program unless 
they are absolutely necessary to address a specific problem when no 
other means would suffice. If a recipient has been unable to remedy the 
effects of egregious discrimination through other means, it may, as a 
last resort, make limited use of set-asides to the extent necessary to 
resolve the problem.

Section 26.45  How Do Recipients Set Overall Goals?

    Since its inception, the recipient's overall goal has been the 
heart of the DBE program. Responding to Adarand, DOT clarified the 
theory and purpose of the overall goal in the SNPRM. In the proposed 
rule, the Department made clear that the purpose of the overall goal--
and, in fact, the DBE program as a whole--is to achieve a ``level 
playing field'' for DBEs seeking to participate in federal-aid 
transportation contracting. To reach a level playing field, recipients 
need to examine their programs and their markets and determine the 
amount of participation they would expect DBEs to achieve in the 
absence of discrimination and the effects of past discrimination. The 
focus of the goal section of the SNPRM was to propose ways to measure 
what a level playing field would look like and to seek input on the 
availability of data to make such a measurement.

The Proposed Rule and Comments

    The Department proposed several options that recipients might use 
for setting overall goals, including three alternative formulas for 
measuring the availability of ready, willing and able DBEs in local 
markets. The specific formulas will be discussed below, but generally, 
they each called for setting a goal that reflected the percentage of 
locally available firms that were DBEs (i.e. dividing the number of 
DBEs by the number of all businesses). On all of the alternatives, the 
SNPRM sought comments on both the feasibility and practical value of 
the options, as well as the prospects for combining any of the 
approaches and the question of whether to mandate a single approach or 
allow each recipient to choose amongst the options. We invited 
commenters to propose changes to any of the details of the options or 
to devise entirely new ones. Finally, we asked commenters for their 
input on the availability of reliable data for use with each of the 
options.
    Hundreds of commenters of all types--including DBEs and non-DBEs, 
prime and subcontractors, state and local recipients, industry and 
interest groups and private individuals--responded with a wealth of 
feedback, opinions and data. It is an understatement to say that there 
was no consensus among commenters as to the best way to set overall 
goals. Support for the proposed options was almost evenly spread over 
the choices presented, with many commenters firmly against all of the 
options. Still more suggested that the current, non-formulaic method 
was the best way to ensure the flexibility to respond to local market 
conditions. Similarly, among those who expressed an opinion, commenters 
were split between the propriety of choosing a single ``best'' method 
and imposing it on all recipients and allowing recipients to choose 
amongst all the options. One of the few universal themes in the goal-
setting comments was the problem of the availability of reliable data 
on the number of DBE and non-DBE contractors.
    There were a few common threads that different groups of commenters 
tended to apply to all of the formulas. Among recipients, many comments 
focused on the lack of data about non-DBE contractors, especially 
subcontractors. Recipients often noted that they would not have the 
information needed for the denominator of any of the formulas (i.e. the 
total number of available businesses). Non-DBE contractors--and 
industry groups representing them--generally believed that there should 
be a capacity measure built into any goal setting mechanism. Finally, 
DBEs--and their industry associations--were concerned that all of the 
formulas would create goals based only on the current number of DBEs, 
locking in the effects of past discrimination by ignoring the fact that 
the lack of opportunities in the past has suppressed the number of DBE 
firms available today.
    Under the proposed rule's Alternative 1, recipients would calculate 
the percentage of DBE firms in their directories among all firms 
available to work on their DOT-assisted contracts. Under Alternative 2, 
recipients would calculate the percentage of all minority-and women-
owned firms in certain SIC codes in their areas among all firms in 
these SIC codes in the same areas. Under Alternative 3, recipients 
would calculate a percentage based on the average number of DBE firms 
that had worked on their DOT-assisted contracts in recent years divided 
by the average number of all firms that had worked on their DOT-
assisted contracts in the same period. The SNPRM also proposed that 
recipients could use other means, such a disparity studies or goals 
developed by other recipients serving the same area, as a basis for 
their goals.
    Each of the three proposed alternatives received some support, 
though this was often the rather tepid endorsement of commenters who 
felt that one or another alternative was the

[[Page 5109]]

best of a bad lot. Non-DBE contractors often claimed that the 
alternatives would unfairly increase goals, while DBE contractors often 
claimed that the same proposals would unfairly decrease goals.
    Commenters said that data for determining the denominators of the 
equations in Alternatives 1 and 2, as well as the numerator in 
Alternative 2, did not exist and that it would be a major, time-
consuming job to begin to obtain the data. Adaptation of existing 
information from other sources (e.g., Census data) was said to have 
significant statistical difficulties. The difficulty of getting data on 
out-of-state firms was emphasized in some comments.
    Commenters looked on the alternatives as cumbersome, creating 
unreasonable administrative burdens, and as producing statistical 
results that were skewed in various ways. The use of DBE directories as 
the source of the numerator in Alternative 1 was criticized on the 
basis that directories may contain firms that never actually 
participate in DOT-assisted contracts. It was suggested that the number 
of firms bidding rather than the number of firms certified would be a 
more reliable guide, but it was also pointed out that, because 
subcontractors seldom formally bid for work, this data would be hard to 
obtain. Some commenters proposed adding overall population statistics 
to the mix.
    A significant number of commenters--primarily non-DBE contractors, 
but including some recipients and other commenters as well--emphasized 
the need to take ``capacity'' into account. Most popular among these 
comments was using a capacity version of Alternative 3. These comments 
did not propose a method of determining the capacity of the firms 
contracting with the recipient.

The Final Rule

    In view of the complexity and importance of the goal setting 
process and the many issues raised by commenters, the Department has 
decided to adopt a two step process for goal setting. The process is 
intended to provide the maximum flexibility for recipients while 
ensuring that goals are based on the availability of ready, willing and 
able DBEs in each recipient's relevant market. The Department believes 
that this approach is critical to meeting our constitutional obligation 
to ensure that the program is narrowly tailored to remedy the effects 
of discrimination. The first step of the process will be to create a 
baseline figure for the relative availability of ready, willing and 
able DBEs in each recipient's market. The second step will be to make 
adjustments from the base figure, relying on an examination of 
additional evidence, past experience, local expertise and anticipated 
changes in DOT-assisted contracting over the coming year.
Step 1: Determining a Base Figure for the Overall Goal
    The base figure is intended to be a measurement of the current 
percentage of ready, willing and able businesses that are DBEs. 
Ensuring that this figure is based on demonstrable evidence of each 
recipient's relevant market conditions will help to ensure that the 
program remains narrowly tailored. To be explicit, recipients cannot 
simply use the 10 percent national goal, their goal from the previous 
year, or their DBE participation level from the previous year as their 
base figure. Instead, all recipients must take an actual measurement of 
their marketplace, using the best evidence they have available, and 
derive a base figure that is as fair and accurate a representation as 
possible of the percentage of available businesses that are DBEs.
    There are many different ways to measure the contracting market and 
assess the relative availability of DBEs. As discussed above, the SNPRM 
proposed three alternate formulas to measure relative availability, 
none of which were particularly popular with commenters. In this final 
rule, the Department is placing primary emphasis on the principles 
underlying the measurement, mandating only that a measurement of the 
relative availability of DBEs be made on the basis of demonstrable 
evidence of relevant market conditions, rather than requiring that any 
particular procedure or formula be used. The final rule contains a 
number of examples of how to create a base figure which recipients are 
free to adopt in their entirety or to use as guidelines for how to 
devise their own measurement.
    There are several reasons we have taken this approach. First, the 
Department is aware of the differences in available data in various 
markets across the nation. The flexibility inherent in this approach 
will ensure that all recipients can use the procedure to set a 
reasonable goal and allow each recipient to use the best data available 
to it. As discussed in another section, this rule will also provide for 
the development of more standard data for future goal setting. Second, 
for many recipients, setting goals in this way will be a new exercise. 
By fixing only the basic principle, but allowing the methodology to 
change, recipients will have the opportunity to fine tune the process 
each year as their experience grows and the data available to them 
improve. Finally, the rule makes sure that every recipient will have at 
least one reasonable and practical goal setting method available to 
them.
    The first example for setting a base figure relies on data sources 
that are immediately available to all recipients: their DBE 
directories, and a Census Bureau database that DOT and the Census 
Bureau will make available to all recipients that wish to use it. This 
example has its roots in the first two goal setting formulas proposed 
in the SNPRM. Recipients would first assess the number of ready, 
willing and able DBEs based on their own directories. For some 
recipients this will be as simple as counting the number of firms in 
their directory. For others, particularly those using directories 
maintained by other agencies, the directories will have to be 
``filtered'' for firms involved in transportation contracting. The 
resulting number of DBEs would become the numerator. The denominator 
would then be derived from the Census Bureau's County Business Pattern 
(CBP) database. We will provide user-friendly electronic access to the 
database via the internet to allow recipients to input the geographic 
area and SIC codes in which they contract and receive a number for the 
availability of all businesses.
    There are several issues that must be addressed when comparing 
numbers derived from two different data sources, some of which were 
raised in the comments on the SNPRM. Recipients will need to ensure 
that the scope of businesses included in the numerator is as close as 
possible to the scope included in the denominator. Using as close as 
possible to the same SIC codes and geographic base is very important. A 
recipient using its own DBE directory, particularly one that contains 
only firms in the fields in which it contracts, will still need to 
determine what fields it will use for the denominator when sorting 
through the CBP database. The best way to do this would be to examine 
their contracting program and determine the SIC codes in which they let 
the substantial majority of their contracts and subcontracts. The 
geographic area used for both the numerator and the denominator should 
cover the area from which the recipient draws the substantial majority 
of its contractors. While it may be sufficient for some state 
recipients to use their state borders as their contracting area, local 
transit and airport recipients will rarely have such an obvious choice. 
Those recipients will need to more carefully examine the

[[Page 5110]]

geographic area from which they draw contractors and base their 
calculation of both the numerator and denominator of the equation on 
the same area.
    The Department and the Census Bureau will make the CBP data 
available in a format that gives recipients as much flexibility as 
possible to tailor the data to their contracting programs. Recipients 
will be able to extract the data in one block for all of the SIC codes 
they expect to contract in, or by individual SIC codes, allowing them 
to weight the relative availability of DBEs in various fields, giving 
more weight to the fields in which they spend more money. For example, 
let us assume a recipient estimates that it will expend 10% of its 
federal aid funds within SIC code 15, 40% in SIC code 16, 25% in SIC 
code 17, and the remaining 25% on contracting spread over SIC codes 07, 
42 and 87. The recipient could separately determine the relative 
availability of DBEs for each of the three major construction SIC codes 
(i.e., 15, 16 and 17) and the relative availability of DBEs in the 
other three SIC codes grouped together and weight each according to the 
amount of money to be spent in each area. In this example, the 
recipient could calculate its weighted base figure by first determining 
the number of DBEs in its directory for each of the groups, then 
extracting the availability of CBP businesses for the same groups. It 
would then perform the following calculation to arrive at a base figure 
for step one of the goal setting process:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR02FE99.000

As has been stated generally, this formula is offered only as an 
example of a way that a recipient could choose to use the CBP database. 
Recipients using the CBP data should choose whether to weight their 
calculation, and whether to do so by individual SIC codes or by groups 
of SIC codes, based on their own assessment of what method will best 
fit their spending pattern.\1\
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    \1\ While it is not statistically necessary to account for 100% 
of program dollars when performing this type of weighting, the 
greater the percentage accounted for, the more accurate the 
resulting calculation will be.
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    Finally, there is still the question of the propriety of comparing 
data from two sources as different as DBE directories and the CBP. As 
mentioned above, some commenters asserted that the directories may 
contain firms that do not normally perform DOT-assisted contracts. This 
problem is greatest, of course, for directories maintained by other 
agencies for purposes beyond DOT-assisted contracting. We believe that 
the recipient's knowledge of its contracting needs and the contents of 
its DBE directory will allow it to solve this problem by sorting the 
directories by SIC code to extract only the firms likely to be 
interested in DOT-assisted contracting. Any remaining effect from DBEs 
that are certified in the relevant SIC codes but still do not intend to 
compete for DOT-assisted contracts will be more than offset by the 
hurdles involved in actually becoming a DBE. It is important to note 
here that the certification process itself, with its paperwork, review 
and on-site inspection, create a filter on the number of existing firms 
that will be counted in the numerator without there being any 
equivalent filter culling firms out of the denominator. Ultimately, the 
Department chose these two data sources for the example because; while 
they may not be perfect, they represent the best universally available 
current data on both the presence of DBEs and the presence of all 
businesses in local markets. Any recipient that believes it has 
available to it better sources of local data from which to make a 
similar calculation for its base figure is encouraged to use them.
    The second example for calculating a base figure is using a bidders 
list to determine the relative availability of DBEs. The concept is 
similar to the one described above. The recipient would divide the 
number of available ready, willing and able DBEs by the number for all 
firms. The difference is that instead of measuring availability by DBE 
certifications and Census data, the recipient would measure 
availability by the number of firms that have directly participated in, 
or attempted to participate in, DOT-assisted contracting in the recent 
past. This approach has its roots in Alternative 3 from the SNPRM. Of 
fundamental importance to this approach is that the recipient would 
need to include all firms that have sought DOT-assisted contracts, 
regardless of whether they did so by bidding on a prime contract or 
quoting a job as a subcontractor. Because most DOT recipients derive 
the substantial majority of their DBE participation through 
subcontracting, it is absolutely essential that all DBE and non-DBE 
firms that quote subcontracts be included in the bidders list.\2\ 
Bidders lists are a very focussed measure of ready, willing and able 
firms because they filter the pool of available firms by requiring a 
demonstration of their ability to participate in the process through 
tracking and identifying contracting opportunities, understanding the 
requirements of a particular job and assembling a bid for it. Another 
attractive feature of the bidding ``filter'' is that it applies equally 
to both DBEs and non-DBEs.
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    \2\ To prevent any confusion, it is important to note that the 
DBE program does not use the so-called ``benchmarking'' system 
employed in direct Federal procurement. The benchmarking system 
relies on a unique database created specifically for use in the 
federal procurement program.
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    The third example included in the final rule for setting a base 
figure is using data derived from a disparity study. As was discussed 
in the SNPRM, the Department is not requiring recipients to do a 
disparity study, but is only making clear that use of disparity study 
data by recipients that have them or choose to conduct them is a valid 
means of setting a goal. Disparity studies generally contain a wide 
array of statistical data, as well as anecdotal data and analysis that 
can be particularly useful in the goal setting process. We list 
disparity studies here, not because they are needed to justify 
operating the DBE program--Congress has already established the 
compelling need for the DBE program--but because the data a good 
disparity study provides can be an excellent guide for a recipient to 
use to set a narrowly tailored goal.
    The Department will not set out specific requirements for what data 
or analysis is required before a disparity study can be used for 
setting a goal, because we believe that the design and conduct of the 
study is best left to the local officials and the professional 
organizations with which they contract to conduct the studies. Instead, 
we again offer simple general principles that should apply to all 
studies used for goal setting. Any study data relied on in the goal 
setting process should be as recent as possible and be focussed on the 
transportation contracting industry. When setting the goal, first use 
the study's statistical evidence to set a base figure for the relative 
availability of DBEs. Other study information, whether it is anecdotal 
data, analysis or statistical information about related

[[Page 5111]]

fields, should be included when making adjustments to the base figure 
(discussed in more detail below), but not included in the base figure 
for the relative availability of DBEs.
    The last specific example included in the rule is using the goal of 
another recipient as the base figure for goal setting. This option was 
also included in the SNPRM. It is intended to avoid duplicative work 
and to lighten the burden the goal setting process might put on smaller 
recipients. It is important to note that a recipient could only use 
another recipient's goal if it was set in accordance with this rule and 
the other recipient performed similar contracting in a similar market 
area. Using another recipient's approved goal would only satisfy the 
first step of the goal setting process. It would serve as the base 
figure, and could not be used to skip over step two of the process. The 
recipient would need to examine the same additional evidence it would 
otherwise use to determine whether to adjust its goal from the base 
figure, as well as being required to make adjustments to account for 
differences in its local market or contracting program.
    The final rule also maintains the option of devising an alternative 
method of calculating a base figure for the goal setting process. 
Explicitly listing this option serves to emphasize the point that the 
options in the rule are examples meant as guidelines intended to ensure 
maximum flexibility for recipients. Recipients can use this option to 
take advantage of their unique expertise or any unique source of data 
that they have that may not be available to other recipients. The 
concerned operating administration will review and approve the 
proposals of recipients that believe they can calculate a base figure 
that will better reflect their relevant market than any of the examples 
provided in this rule. Approval will be contingent on the proposals 
following the same principles that apply to any recipient: the 
methodology must be based on demonstrable data of relevant market 
conditions and be designed to reach a goal that the recipient would 
expect DBEs to achieve in the absence of discrimination.
Step 2: Adjusting the Base Figure
    As alluded to above, measuring the relative availability of DBEs to 
derive a base figure is only the first step of the goal setting 
process. To ensure that they arrive at goals that truly and accurately 
reflect the participation they would expect absent the effects of 
discrimination, recipients must go beyond the formulaic measurement of 
current availability to account for other evidence of conditions 
affecting DBEs. To accomplish this second step, recipients must first 
survey their jurisdiction to determine what types of relevant evidence 
is available to them. Then, relying on their own knowledge of their 
contracting markets they must review the evidence to determine whether 
either an up or down adjustment from the base figure is needed.
    One universally available form of evidence that all recipients 
should consider is the proven capacity of DBEs to perform work on DOT-
assisted contracts. All recipients have been tracking and reporting the 
dollar volume of work that is contracted and subcontracted to DBEs each 
year. Viewed in isolation, the past achievements of DBEs do not reflect 
the availability of DBEs relative to all available businesses, but it 
is an important and current measure of the ability of DBEs to perform 
on DOT-assisted contracts.
    Though not universally available, there are hundreds of existing 
disparity studies that contain a wealth of statistical and anecdotal 
evidence on the utilization of disadvantaged businesses. In addition to 
being a possible source of data for Step 1 of the goal setting process, 
disparity studies should be considered during Step 2 of the process. 
The base figure from Step 1 is intended to determine the relative 
availability of DBEs. The data and analysis in a disparity study can 
help a recipient determine whether those existing businesses are under- 
or over-utilized. If a recipient has a study with disparity ratios 
showing that existing DBEs are receiving significantly less work than 
expected, an upward adjustment from the base figure is called for. 
Similarly, if the disparity ratio shows overutilization, a downward 
adjustment to the base figure would be warranted. The anecdotal 
evidence and analysis of contracting requirements and conditions that 
may have a discriminatory impact on DBEs are also important sources 
that should be examined when determining what adjustment to make to the 
base figure.\3\ Finally, disparity studies that are conducted within a 
recipient's jurisdiction should be examined even if they were not done 
specifically for the recipient. For example, a state highway agency may 
find useful data and analysis in either a statewide disparity study 
covering other agencies or in a disparity study examining contracting 
in a county or city within the state.
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    \3\ It is important to note that adjusting the goal is only part 
of the response a recipient should make to evidence of 
discriminatory barriers for DBEs. All recipients have a primary 
responsibility to ensure non-discrimination in their progrms and 
should act aggressively to remove any discriminatory barriers in 
their programs.
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    If a recipient uses another recipient's goal as its base figure 
under Step 1 of the goal setting process, it will have to make 
additional adjustments to ensure that its final goal is narrowly 
tailored to its market and contracting program. For example, if a local 
transit or airport authority adopts a statewide goal as its base 
figure, it must determine the extent that local relative availability 
of DBEs differs from the relative availability of DBEs in the 
contracting area relied on by the state. The local recipient would also 
need to examine the differences in the type of contracting work in its 
program and determine whether there are significant differences in the 
relative availability of DBEs in any fields that are unique to its 
program--or unique to the program of the other recipient. Similarly, if 
one local recipient used the goal of another local recipient in the 
same market as its base figure, it would also need to adjust for 
differences in the contracting fields used by the two programs.
    Finally, the rule contains a brief list of other types of data a 
recipient could consider when adjusting its base figure to arrive at an 
overall goal. The list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. 
Instead, it is meant as a guide to the types of information a recipient 
should look for in Step 2 of the goal setting process. There is a wide 
array of relevant local, regional and national information about the 
utilization of disadvantaged businesses. Recipients are encouraged to 
cast as wide a net as they can to carefully examine their contracting 
programs and the public and private markets in which they operate.

Additional Goal Setting Issues

    The Department proposed, in both the 1992 NPRM and the 1997 SNPRM, 
that overall goals be calculated as a percentage of DOT funds a 
recipient expects to expend in DOT-assisted contracts. This is 
different from the existing part 23 rule, which asked recipients to set 
overall goals on the basis of all funds, including state and local 
funds, to be expended in DOT-assisted contracts. This change is for 
accounting and administrative convenience and is not intended to have a 
substantive effect on the program. While not the subject of many 
comments, those who did comment on the proposal favored the change. The 
final rule adopts this approach.
    A few recipients commented that public participation concerning 
goal setting was bothersome. Nevertheless,

[[Page 5112]]

we view it as an essential part of the goal setting process. There are 
many stakeholders involved in setting goals, and it is reasonable that 
they should be involved in the process and have an opportunity for 
comment. The part 23 provision requiring getting a state governor's 
approval of a goal of less than 10 percent has been eliminated, both 
because overall goals are no longer tied to the national 10 percent 
goal and to reduce administrative burdens.
    The goal setting provision of the final rule continues to direct 
recipients to set one annual overall goal for DBEs, rather than group-
specific goals separating minority and women-owned businesses.

Section 26.47  Can Recipients Be Penalized for Failing To Meet Overall 
Goals?

    This is a new section of the regulation, the purpose of which is to 
clarify the Department's views on the situations in which it is 
appropriate to impose sanctions on recipients with respect to goals. 
The provision states explicitly what has long been the Department's 
policy: no recipient is sanctioned, or found in noncompliance, simply 
because it fails to meet its overall goal. In fact, through the history 
of the DBE program, the Department never has sanctioned a recipient for 
failing to obtain a particular amount of DBE participation.
    On the other hand, if a recipient fails to set an overall goal 
which the concerned operating administration approves, or fails to 
operate its program in good fai